Evolutionary accounts of the origins of human morality may lead us to doubt the truth of our moral judgments. Sidgwick tried to vindicate ethics from this kind of external attack. However, he ended The Methods in despair over another problem—an apparent conflict between rational egoism and universal benevolence, which he called the “dualism of practical reason.” Drawing on Sidgwick, we show that one way of defending objectivity in ethics against Sharon Street’s recent evolutionary critique also puts us in a position (...) to support a bold claim: the dualism of practical reason can be resolved in favor of impartiality. (shrink)

Sidgwick's defence of esoteric morality has been heavily criticized, for example in Bernard Williams's condemnation of it as 'Government House utilitarianism.' It is also at odds with the idea of morality defended by Kant, Rawls, Bernard Gert, Brad Hooker, and T.M. Scanlon. Yet it does seem to be an implication of consequentialism that it is sometimes right to do in secret what it would not be right to do openly, or to advocate publicly. We defend Sidgwick on this issue, and (...) show that accepting the possibility of esoteric morality makes it possible to explain why we should accept consequentialism, even while we may feel disapproval towards some of its implications. (shrink)

Utilitarianism may well be the most influential secular ethical theory in the world today. It is also one of the most controversial. It clashes, or is widely thought to clash, with many conventional moral views, and with human rights when they are seen as inviolable. Would it, for example, be right to torture a suspected terrorist in order to prevent an attack that could kill and injure a large number of innocent people? In this Very Short Introduction Peter Singer and (...) Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek provide an authoritative account of the nature of utilitarianism, from its nineteenth-century origins, to its justification and its varieties. Considering how utilitarians can respond to objections that are often regarded as devastating, they explore the utilitarian answer to the question of whether torture can ever be justified. They also discuss what it is that utilitarians should seek to maximize, paying special attention to the classical utilitarian view that only pleasure or happiness is of intrinsic value. Singer and de Lazari-Radek conclude by analysing the continuing importance of utilitarianism in the world, indicating how it is a force for new thinking on contemporary moral challenges like global poverty, the treatment of animals, climate change, reducing the risk of human extinction, end-of-life decisions for terminally-ill patients, and the shift towards assessing the success of government policies in terms of their impact on happiness. ABOUT THE SERIES: The Very Short Introductions series from Oxford University Press contains hundreds of titles in almost every subject area. These pocket-sized books are the perfect way to get ahead in a new subject quickly. Our expert authors combine facts, analysis, perspective, new ideas, and enthusiasm to make interesting and challenging topics highly readable. (shrink)

Tests the views and metaphor of 19th-century utilitarian philosopher Henry Sidgwick against a variety of contemporary views on ethics, determining that they are defensible and thus providing a defense of objectivism in ethics and of hedonistic utilitarianism.

In this article we argue that it is reasonable to believe that normal vertebrate animals can feel pleasure, and that there is sufficient evidence for a capacity for pleasure in some invertebrates. It follows that the pleasures of animals are morally significant. We argue for that in a few steps. First, we explain why philosophers used to concentrate more on pain rather than pleasure in regard to animals. Second, we define the notion of pleasure and show how it implies to (...) non-human animals. Third we discuss whether animals are conscious beings and how they may feel pleasure. It is true that we do not know exactly how pain and pleasure feel to nonhumans, but this is also true for other humans. Even though we can give a detailed verbal description of what we feel, pains and pleasures are subjective and we do not have any certain insight into what another human is feeling. This limitation should not stop us from behaving in a way that takes into account the fact that both we and many nonhuman animals are beings who can suffer and enjoy. (shrink)

In the first two volumes of On What Matters, Derek Parfit argues that three major normative theories – Kantianism, Contractualism and Rule Consequentialism – are, in their most defensible forms, compatible, and can be reconciled in what he calls ‘Triple Theory’. This has led many to assume that Parfit does not believe that Act Consequentialism is a defensible form of Consequentialism. We draw on correspondence with Parfit to show that this assumption is incorrect. We then consider Parfit's efforts, in the (...) third volume of On What Matters, to narrow the differences between Act Consequentialism and the triple theory, in part by treating impartial rationality as an external rival to morality, in much the same way that egoism is an external rival to morality. We argue that Parfit's attempts to bridge the gap between Act Consequentialism and Triple Theory meet with only limited success. (shrink)

Searching for a rational method of moral reasoning, Henry Sidgwick concludes that practical reason is inconsistent and sometimes directs us to actions that are contradictory. Our ultimate duty is in fact to achieve both our own, particular happiness and the happiness at all. We have duties both of a selfish and of a utilitarian nature. In a situation of conflict, when for the public good we must sacrifice our own interests, reason is not able to indicate to us what course (...) of action should be followed. Finally, we must admit that we cannot entirely rationalize our moral choices. The so-called problem of the dualism of practical reason has been and is discussed by many eminent philosophers, including Roger Crisp, John Skorupskiego and Derek Parfit. This paper is an attempt to highlight the considerations of Sidgwick's dualism of practical reason, the sources of dualism and the contemporary reception of this extremely serious problem for ethics. (shrink)

Pandemia Covid-19 poddała próbie poglądy bioetyków na temat alokacji ograniczonych zasobów opieki zdrowotnej. Rozważamy stanowiska zajmowane przez organizacje medyczne i krajowe rady etyki we Włoszech, Hiszpanii, Wielkiej Brytanii, Niemczech i Szwecji. W kilku wypowiedziach tych organów pojęcie godności ludzkiej odgrywa kluczową rolę. Twierdzimy, że użycie tego pojęcia nie pomaga w debacie etycznej. Bronimy poglądu, że decyzje dotyczące alokacji ograniczonych zasobów powinny być podejmowane na podstawie zasady maksymalizacji korzyści netto dla dotkniętych nimi osób. Kończymy pytaniem, czy fakt, że w niektórych regionach, (...) po szczepieniu, które stały się powszechnie dostępne, niedobór łóżek szpitalnych był w dużej mierze spowodowany przez członków społeczności, którzy zdecydowali się nie szczepić przeciwko wirusowi wywołującemu Covid-19, powinien odgrywać rolę w przydzielanie zasobów niezaszczepionym osobom, które później zachorowały na ten wirus. (shrink)

The experience of pleasure, alongside pain, is a primary element of human life. It rules our instincts and desires for food, sex and for the avoidance of various forms of harm. Crucial to psychological and social well-being, it has preoccupied philosophers from Aristotle to John Stuart Mill and plays a fundamental role in moral and ethical theory, especially utilitarianism. More recently, it has become a central subject for psychologists, biologists and neuroscientists. Yet it remains an elusive and deceptively difficult concept. (...) What is pleasure? How does it differ from happiness? Should we value pleasure? Which theories of pleasure are most plausible? In this rigorous and comprehensive introduction to the topic, Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek unpacks and assesses these questions and many more, including: The history of pleasure from ancient Greece to modern times Pleasure, sensation and consciousness What scientific research reveals about the nature of pleasure. Can pleasure be measured scientifically? 'Higher' and 'lower' pleasures The relation between happiness and pleasure Pleasure and pain Pleasure and animals Pleasure as an ultimate good and the relation between pleasure and rationality. Philosophy of Pleasure: An Introduction is essential reading for students of ethics and political philosophy, and also suitable for those studying related disciplines such as psychology, politics and sociology. (shrink)